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COMMENTS
SECOND CIRCUIT REJECTS NEED
REQUIREMENT FOR ATTORNEY
SUBPOENA: IN RE GRAND JURY
SUBPOENA SERVED UPON JOHN DOE,
ESQ. (SLOTNICK)
The sixth amendment, which guarantees every criminal de-
fendant the right to assistance of counsel,1 includes within its am-
bit the attorney-client privilege 2 and the right to choice of coun-
1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[iln all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to. . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." Id.
The constitutional guarantee to the assistance of counsel took modern shape in Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Zerbst, the Supreme Court placed an affirmative duty
upon a federal criminal court to appoint counsel to those unable to secure representation,
id. at 462-63, unless that right was intelligently and competently waived by the accused. Id.
at 465. The guarantee of appointed counsel for a defendant who pleaded guilty was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941). In 1963, the Court
held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the furnishing of
counsel to an indigent defendant in all state criminal proceedings. See Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). "[A] defendant who must face felony charges in state
court without assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment has been denied
due process of law." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).
The sixth amendment right to an attorney arises not only at trial, but also when adver-
sarial judicial proceedings are brought against a defendant. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
688 (1972) (plurality opinion). The defendant's right is triggered by a formal charge, prelim-
inary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Id. at 689. "[T]he accused is guaran-
teed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal
or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right
to a fair trial." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
2 See Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Reform, 23
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 95, 101 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
protects confidentiality of attorney-client relationship); Note, Attorney-Client Communica-
tions of Criminal Defendants: Evidentiary and Constitutional Protections, 62 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 739, 756 (1985) (attorney-client privilege under sixth amendment meant to guarantee
fair trial to accused); Comment, Extending the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Constitutional
Mandate, 13 PAC. L.J. 437, 441 (1982) (privilege interrelated with constitutional guarantees,
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sel.3 According to the defense bar, these rights have recently come
under attack by government prosecutors.4 One technique used by
even though it lacks express constitutional authorization); cf. Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (confidential disclosures by client to attorney privileged when made to
obtain legal assistance).
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981);
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. When the client is certain that what he tells his lawyer cannot be
used against him, full disclosure to the attorney is promoted. Sobel, The Confidential Com-
munication Element of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 4 CARDOZO L. REv. 649, 658-59 (1983).
Protection of such disclosures enables attorneys to act more effectively, justly, and expedi-
tiously. In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984). The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice and advocacy serves public ends by promoting broad public interests in the
observance of lawful administration of justice. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. "The benefits
of the privilege ... outweigh the detriment to the search for truth that occurs when certain
facts are kept out of court." Sobel, supra, at 659.
The recognized components of the attorney-client privilege are:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection [may]
be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, WIGlMORE ON EVMENCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940). The privilege protects only those
disclosures which may not have been made absent the privilege. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403. "If
the information conveyed was not intended to be confidential or if there has been any
breach of confidentiality, if the communication did not pertain to legal advice, or if the
attorney-client relationship has furthered some ongoing crime, the privilege is unavailable."
Weiner, supra at 100 (emphasis original).
3 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) ("the right to counsel being conceded, a
defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his choice"); United
States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1982) (defendant who retains counsel has right of
constitutional dimensions to counsel of his choice); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 55-
56 (3d Cir. 1979) (sixth amendment protects defendant's right to select particular individual
to serve as his attorney).
The defendant's right to choose his attorney emanates from the sixth amendment prin-
ciple that a defendant has a right to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to
mount. Laura, 607 F.2d at 56. The most important decision a defendant makes in shaping
his defense is the selection of his attorney. Id. The attorney informs the defendant of the
legal issues involved, legal options open to the defendant and potential weaknesses in the
prosecution's case. See id. The defendant may also authorize his attorney to make binding
trial strategy decisions. See id. Therefore, a defendant's choice of counsel should not be
treated lightly or arbitrarily, United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1051 (1984); Laura, 607 F.2d at 57; United States ex rel.
Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970), and
should not be unnecessarily obstructed by the court, United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d
1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
4 See e.g., Appleson, Ohio State Bar Fights Lawyers' Subpoenas, A.B.A. BAR-LEADER,
Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 7 (lawyers called before grand jury to testify about their clients); Frank,
Att'y Subpoenas, 72 ABA J., March 1986, at 32, 33 (defense attorneys concerned about
protecting privileged lawyer-client relationship, losing legal fees and conflict of interest
caused by government subpoenas); Are Prosecutors Invading the Attorney Client Relation-
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prosecutors is the service of a subpoena duces tecum5 on an attor-
ney whose client is under grand jury investigation.6 The defense
bar argues that such subpoenas have a chilling effect upon the at-
torney-client relationship,7 and, in some instances, may actually
ship?, 71 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 38, 38 [hereinafter Attorney Client Relationship] (prosecu-
tors demand that lawyers disclose sources of fees and other information); Galante, The De-
fense Bar: On the Defensive, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 9, 1985, at 3, col. 2 (prosecutor's increasing use
of lawyer subpoenas and fee-forfeiture requests have harmful effect on right to counsel and
criminal defense bar's ability to represent clients); Chambers, Criminal Lawyers in Study
Say New Laws Inhibit Case Choices, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A20, col. 1 (defense
lawyers revamp method of handling white collar, racketeering, and drug cases as result of
new Federal laws) [hereinafter Chambers]; Riley, Judge Quashes Lawyers' Subpoenas,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 6, 1984, at 3, col. 1 (New Hampshire federal judge accuses local U.S. attor-
ney of harrassing five criminal defense lawyers with grand jury subpoenas).
" The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure § 17(c) provide that "[a] subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or
other objects designated therein." FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
8 See In Re Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. (Under Seal), 774 F.2d
624 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1514 (1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, John
Doe (Arnold Weiner, Doe's Attorney), 754 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1985); see also In re Grand
Jury Matters (Appeal of United States), 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984) (grand jury subpoena
issued to attorneys who, in state criminal prosecutions, served as defense counsel for grand
jury targets); In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984) (grand jury subpoena duces tecum
requiring attorney to reveal fee arrangements and property transfers involving certain
named persons); In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1983)
(former attorney of grand jury target served with subpoena duces tecum as to documents
drawn up while target retained attorney).
Through the use of subpoenas duces tecum, prosecutors have sought to compel lawyers
to disclose the sources of their fees and other information concerning the client. Attorney-
Client Relationship, supra note 4, at 38; Chambers, supra note 4, at A20, col. 1. Prosecutors
contend that the subpoenas may be relevant to establish unexplained wealth or the exis-
tence of an "association in fact" for grand juries investigating racketeering activity. Attor-
ney Client Relationship, supra note 4, at 38-39. Grand juries also used the subpoenas to
discover the identity of a drug ring leader who guaranteed legal assistance to his associates
if they got caught, and in identifying a benefactor who paid the legal expenses of persons
who attempted to stifle a grand jury investigation through their lack of cooperation. See
Weiner, supra note 2, at 116.
See Kreiger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the New Law, 22 Ari. CRiM. L.
REV. 737, 744 (1984) (lawyer's compelled admissions diminish confidentiality implicit in at-
torney-client relationship); Weiner, supra note 2, at 96 (subpoena to attorney casts pall over
attorney-client relationship); see also Cates, Fee Information Not Privileged, Judge Rules,
NAT'L L.J., March 25, 1985, at 10 col. 1 (defense bar worried about chilling effect on attor-
ney-client relationship where attorney ordered to disclose his fees from client indicted in
drug trafficking to grand jury).
Compelling the attorney to provide evidence against his client arouses distrust and anx-
iety, the defense bar argues, and thus chills the flow of informantion from the client to the
attorney. Weiner, supra note 2, at 96. If the client fears that his opponents may gain access
to privileged communications, he will inevitably be less likely to openly converse with his
attorney. See Note, Government Intrusions Into the Defense Camp: Undermining the
Right to Counsel, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1984) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. See also
Rannii, Law Offices: A Sanctuary Under Siege, NAT'L L.J., Feb 8, 1982, at 1, col. 4 (law
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force attorneys to disqualify themselves from representing the cli-
ent in future judicial proceedings arising from the investigation.8
Thus, it has been argued that the government should be required
to demonstrate "need" as a prerequisite to the enforcement of such
subpoenas." Recently, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon
John Doe, Esq. (Slotnick),10 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that where an attorney for the target of
a grand jury investigation "I is served with a subpoena duces tecum
enforcement officers' use of warrants to search lawyers' offices has potentially chilling effect
on sixth amendment right to counsel). As a result of the chill in the flow of communication,
the attorney may lack a full understanding of his client's case and he may thus be unable to
represent his client's interests as effectively as possible. Harvard Note, supra, at 1145.
8 See Mob Defenders: As Corrupt as Their Clients?, 71 A.BA. J., July 1985, at 32, 33
(prosecutors seek to disqualify lawyers who appear to be involved in criminal activities with
their clients); Krieger & Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 742 (when lawyer is called as witness
or his records subpoenaed, he becomes witness to material element of offense and with-
drawal is mandated); Galante, supra note 4, at 3, col. 2 (subpoenas of defense lawyers create
conflicts of interest that force disqualification).
The basis for an attorney's disqualification is drawn from the ABA Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. The Code provides that:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness
other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation until it is
apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmILITY DR 5-102(B) (1986).
The defense bar argues that prosecutors might abuse process to disqualify "successful,
recalcitrant, obnoxious, or obfuscating defense lawyers from pending cases," Riley, supra
note 4, at 3, col. 1, and affect selection of the defendant's counsel. See Attorney-Client
Relationship, supra note 4, at 39; Kreiger & Van Dusen, supra note 7, at 743; Galante,
supra note 4, at 8.
1 See Weiner, supra note 2, at 129-30 (need requirement should be included in Justice
Department guidelines for issuance of subpoenas); Galante, supra note 4, at 3, col. 2 (prose-
cutors should file affidavit stating necessity for subpoenaed information); DePetris & Bach-
rach, supra note 7, at 1, col. 3 (government should be prepared to make clear showing of
need when issuing post-indictment subpoenas).
The need test involves "an assessment of the probative value and the importance of the
proof, the ability of the Government to acquire proof of the same facts or other proof of
similar value from other sources and a weighing of these against as assessment of the
prejudice to the defendant's sixth amendment right, both in terms of likelihood of occur-
rence and of seriousness." United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). The defense bar argues that such a showing will help control the tremendous chill in
attorney-client relationships caused by government practices. Galante, supra note 4, at 1. A
failure to demonstrate need would cause the subpoena to be quashed by the district court
judge. See FED. R. CraM. P. 17(c) ("[tlhe court .. , may quash . . .the subpoena if compli-
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive").
:0 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
1 See Arkin, Target or Subject of Inquiry-Defense Counsel's Dilemma, N.Y.L.J.,
Oct. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 3. Target means "a person as to whom the prosecutor of the grand
jury has substantial evidence linking him to the commission of a crime and who, in the
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concerning benefactor payments, the client has no constitutional
right, statutory protection, or common law privilege from which a
need requirement may be derived or implied. 2
In Slotnick, a grand jury investigated the activities of an al-
leged organized crime family faction known as the "Anthony
Columbo crew."' 3 The grand jury, which sought to determine
whether Columbo paid or arranged for the legal representation of
members of his crew, served Barry Slotnick, the attorney for
Columbo, with a subpoena duces tecum.'4 Slotnick moved to quash
the subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c),' 5 asserting that the government failed to establish the need
for the information, or its relevance.' 6 The district court denied the
motion to quash,'17 but a panel decision of the circuit court of ap-
peals reversed this decision.' After a rehearing en banc, the Sec-
ond Circuit vacated the judgment and opinion of the panel and
affirmed the order of the district court.19 Subsequent to the panel
decision, but before the en banc rehearing, Columbo and members
judgement of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant." Id. (quoting United States Attorney's
Manual § 9-11.250).
12 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 250.
" Id. at 242. A number of serious offenses were under investigation, including murder,
racketeering, gambling, extortion, interstate transportation of stolen property, and other
federal crimes. Id.
14 See id. at 242. The prosecutor affirmed at oral argument that the subpoena would be
limited specifically to benefactor payments made by Columbo on behalf of his crew mem-
bers. Id. Evidence of such benefactor payments made to Slotnick could have established
Columbo as the head of an "enterprise" as that term is defined in the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(a)(4) (1982). The government assured the court that the subpoena
would not encompass Columbo's payments to Slotnick for his own representation in the
past, nor for Columbo's representation in connection with other outstanding indictments.
Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 242.
" See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). The rule alows a district court judge "on motion made
promptly [to] quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or op-
pressive." Id.
'" See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 242; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discus-
sion of need requirement).
17 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 242.
8 See id. The panel decision held that "when a subpoena is issued to an attorney to
testify before a grand jury investigating his client whom he has theretofore represented, and
where the attorney will be disqualified if he testifies, the Government should make a prelim-
inary showing of relevance and reasonable need." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon
John Doe, Esq., 759 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated en banc, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1515 (1986).
19 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 242.
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of his "crew" were indicted on several federal charges.2 "
Writing for the court, Judge Timbers reasoned that because
no adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated against
Columbo at the pre-indictment stage, his sixth amendment rights
did not yet attach.21 Columbo's interest in continued representa-
tion by his present counsel was not constitutionally protected, 22
and therefore no constitutional requirement mandated a prelimi-
nary showing of need or relevancy.23 Judge Timbers also asserted
that since client identity and fee information did not fall under the
protection of the attorney client privilege,24 a preliminary showing
was not required by statute or under the common law. ' Further-
more, the court reasoned that a preliminary showing of need would
unjustifiably impede the investigative function of the grand jury.26
20 See id. However, the charges did not include the alleged RICO violations which led
to the subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 243.
21 See id. at 244. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir. 1982); Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 21
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 921 (1980). The Kirby plurality opinion declared that a
person's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversarial
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. Kirby also
stated that these proceedings are initiated by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment. Id. at 689. The Second Circuit adopted this rea-
soning in Carvey, 611 F.2d at 21, and has also held that the sixth amendment rights of an
unindicted target of a grand jury investigation do not attach by virtue of that investigation.
See Vasquez, 675 F.2d at 17. The Supreme Court has emphatically stated that "[a] witness
before a grand jury cannot insist ... on being represented by his counsel." In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957).
22 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 244.
22 See id.; see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (where no valid constitu-
tional privilege raised, no reason to require a preliminary showing); In re Liberatore, 574
F.2d 78, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1978) (where no constitutional rights implicated, government has no
burden whatsoever to make preliminary showing of relevancy or need).
24 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 247-48; see In re Shargel, Esq., 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.
1984) (disclosure of client identity and fee information not covered by attorney-client privi-
lege, even when client faces incrimination); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38
(2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
25 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 247. The court also reasoned that at the time a benefactor
offers an attorney payment for the legal representation of others, the attorney should be
aware that fee information is not privileged. Id. at 248. The attorney should at that time
explain to his client that a potential conflict may arise. Id. Since both attorney and client
would then be aware of the potential conflict at this early stage of communication, the court
asserted that they should not complain that disclosure of benefactor payments might chill
their relationship. Id.
20 See id. at 248. The Slotnick Court stated that:
Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary show-
ings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in
the fair and expeditious administration of criminal laws. The grand jury may not
always serve its historic role as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the
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The court held that the potentially competing interests which may
result in disqualification should be examined at the pre-trial stage,
not during the grand jury investigation stage.2 7
The Second Circuit declared that upon indictment, Columbo's
sixth amendment rights attached.2 However, the court concluded
that the indictment did not bar Slotnick from testifying about
benefactor payments before the grand jury. 29 The court stated
that despite the indictment, the fee information sought by the gov-
ernment was still unprotected by the attorney-client privilege.30
Moreover, the court held that Rule 17(c), applied together with
sixth amendment considerations, 31 adequately protected the ac-
cused from unreasonable or oppressive demands upon his coun-
sel.3 2 After applying the standards of Rule 17(c),33 and finding the
information that the government sought to be relevant and highly
probative,3 4 the Second Circuit held that Columbo's sixth amend-
ment interests did not outweigh the grand jury's need for the in-
formation.3 5 The risk of disqualification, Judge Timbers ruled, did
not provide a sufficient reason to quash the subpoena, 3 but was an
issue for determination at an in limine hearing held by the trial
judge.37
ordinary citizen and an over-zealous prosecutor, but if it is even to approach the
proper performance of its constitutional mission, it must be free to pursue its in-
vestigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does not
trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it.
Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 249 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973)). Since
neither attorney nor client raised any valid constitutional claims or statutory privileges, the
Second Circuit determined that there was no infringement upon their rights. See id.
2 See id. at 249-50. The court determined that at the pre-trial stage, a district court
could "weigh the public intrerests-the probative value of the lawyer's testimony, the need
to preserve ethical standards in the legal profession, and the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem-against the accused's right to counsel of his choice." Id. at 250.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 250-52.
10 See id. at 250.
" See id.; see infra notes 44 to 51 and accompanying text.
32 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 251.
13 The court determined that the record was comprehensive enough to deny the motion
to quash the subpoena under Rule 17(c) instead of remanding to the lower court. See id.
" See id. The court said that evidence of benefactor payments was clearly relevant to
the grand jury's investigation of the Columbo crime family and highly probative of the role
of Columbo as the head of that "enterprise." Id.
'5 See id.
26 See id. at 252.
7 See id. at 250. At the pre-trial hearing, the judge will weigh the probative value of
the information sought by the government against the loss of counsel of the accused's
choice. Id.
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In his dissent, Judge Cardamone argued that when defense
counsel is served with a subpoena after his client has been in-
dicted, the government must make a showing of need to justify an
intrusion on the attorney-client relationship. 3 He reasoned that if
Slotnick was subpoenaed without a showing of need and subse-
quently disqualified, Columbo would be arbitrarily deprived of his
counsel's representation for the indicted offenses, thus violating his
sixth amendment rights."9 Judge Cardamone argued that calling an
attorney before a grand jury seriously disrupts the attorney-client
relationship 40 and can result in disqualification of the attorney,41
thereby depriving the client of his fifth amendment due process
rights.42 Therefore, the dissent concluded that requiring defense
counsel to appear before a grand jury without any showing of need
violates the sixth amendment right to counsel in this case and the
fifth amendment due process clause in all cases.' 3
It is suggested that, while the rationale presented by the Sec-
ond Circuit coherently addressed the issues, the need to maintain
grand jury secrecy, as well as its important investigative function,
outweighs the desirability of a "need" requirement. Furthermore,
the court failed to adequately discuss the fifth amendment right to
counsel, as independent from the sixth amendment right, and its
effect on the need requirement. After demonstrating that the sixth
amendment choice of attorney privilege is not absolute, this Com-
ment will examine the importance of grand jury secrecy as com-
pared to the target's sixth amendment right to counsel. The Com-
ment will then address the possible effect of an independent fifth
amendment right to counsel.
SIXTH AMENDMENT CHOICE OF ATTORNEY NOT ABSOLUTE RIGHT
Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to
See id. at 256 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
See id. at 257 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 260-61 (Cardamone, J., dissenting); see supra note 7 (discussion of chilling
effect).
41 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 261-62 (Cardamone, J., dissenting); see supra, note 8 (dis-
cussion of attorney disqualification).
42 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 259-62 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
3 See id. at 254. Chief Judge Feinburg also dissented. Id. at 252-54 (Feinburg, C.J.,
dissenting). He agreed with the conclusions reached by the majority in the panel decision
and by Judge Cardamone in his dissenting opinion. The need requirement, he asserted,
struck a sensible balance between the need to protect sixth amendment rights and the grand
jury's investigative function. Id. at 253 (Feinburg, C.J., dissenting).
1986]
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representation by the attorney of his choice, 44 this right is not ab-
solute.4 5 The defendant must be provided with a fair and reasona-
ble opportunity to secure counsel of his choice," and courts are
prohibited from arbitrarily dismissing such chosen counsel.47 How-
ever, these rights must be weighed and balanced against the public
need for the efficient and effective administration of criminal jus-
tice.48 Moreover, the sixth amendment guarantees reasonably effec-
tive counsel,49 but not any particular lawyer, nor the best lawyer
money can buy. 50 Therefore, where the choice of a particular at-
torney will cause undue delay, subvert judicial proceedings, or oth-
erwise impede the efficient and effective administration of justice,
" See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d
14, 23 (2d Cir. 1982); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir.
1978).
" See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (defendant entitled to fair opportunity
to secure counsel of his choice); Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 479 (3d Cir. 1981) (same);
United States v. Fernandez, 576 F. Supp. 397, 402 (E.D. Tex. 1983) (sixth amendment man-
date satisfied when defendant given fair and reasonable opportunity to obtain particular
counsel), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1493 (1986).
The fair opportunity to secure chosen counsel reflects the fact that the choice of counsel
is ordinarily one for the accused alone. In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1985); but cf.
United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1978) (indigent defendant does not
have choice of counsel; appointment left to sound discretion of court). A voluntary arrange-
ment between the defendant and a lawyer is likely to be the one most satisfactory to the
defendant. Klein, 776 F.2d at 633. Therefore, unless the government has a strong reason for
interfering with this presumptively satisfactory representation, it may not do so. Id.
'" See Davis, 650 F.2d at 479; United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210,
1215 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970); supra note 3. The "sixth amendment
guarantee [to counsel] 'contemplates that such assistance will be untrammeled and
unimpaired.'" United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)). The right should not be unnecessarily obstructed by
the court. United States v. Curcio, 694 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1792 (1986).
" Carey, 409 F.2d at 1214; see also Davis, 650 F.2d at 479 (defendant's counsel choice
balanced against fair and proper administration of justice); United States v. Ostrer, 597
F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979) (same).
' See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Where the defendant com-
plains of the ineffectiveness of his counsel's assistance, he must show that the attorney's
performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 688, and that the
counsel's deficient assistance was so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. at
692. "The Sixth Amendment refers simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular require-
ments of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance of stan-
dards .... [T]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms." Id. at 688.
" See Klein, 776 F.2d at 633; Dolan, 570 F.2d at 1182; Carey, 409 F.2d at 1215.
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the court may require the defendant to secure other counsel.5 1
GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
An important policy underlying a grand jury proceeding is the
need to vest the grand jury with broad investigatory powers.2 The
majority in Slotnick held that imposing a "need" requirement at
the pre-indictment stage would severely and unjustifiably hamper
the investigatory function of the grand jury. 3 It is suggested that
the need to maintain grand jury secrecy also bverrides the desira-
bility of a need requirement.
A. Grand Jury Secrecy
"[T]he proper functioning of our grand jury system depends
upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. ' 's4 Maintaining grand
, See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982) (criminal defendant
forced to relinquish chosen counsel because inability of retained counsel to serve would have
caused unreasonable delay and inconvenience in completing trial); United States v. Ostrer,
597 F.2d 337, 340-41 (2d Cir. 1979) (based on principle that attorney should be disqualified
from opposing former client if during his representation of client he obtained information
relevant to controversy at hand, court ruled that the fair and proper administration of jus-
tice called for attorney's disqualification, thus overriding defendant's right to choice of
counsel); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978) (where actual conflict of
interest impairs ability of criminal defendant's attorney to conforij to ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, court is not required to tolerate inadequate representation of defend-
ant that might impugn fairness of proceeding).
2 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972). The Supreme Court has stated
that because the grand jury's task is to inquire into possible criminal conduct and return
only well-founded indictments, its investigative powers are necessarily broad. Id. The grand
jury "generally is unrestrained by the technical, procedural, and evidentiary rules governing
the conduct of criminal trials." United States v. Calandria, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974). The
authority to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and require the production
of evidence is indispensible to the exercise of the grand jury's power. United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 546, 571 (1976); see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (essential to grand
jury's task is authority to subpoena witnesses). Attendance before a grand jury in order to
testify is a public duty which every person within the jurisdiction is bound to perform upon
being properly summoned. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). "A grand jury's
investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all
witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed." United
States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970).
5 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 248-49; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979); see also Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959) (making public any part of
grand jury proceeding inevitably detracts from its efficiency); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
in Matter of Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1576 (11th Cir. 1983) (need to preserve secrecy of
grand jury investigation of paramount importance).
The Supreme Court has stated that the main reasons for maintaining grand jury se-
crecy are:
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jury secrecy is fundamental to the promotion of free, independent
grand jurors. 5 Despite assertions of a statutory right to automatic
disclosure of grand jury materials, such disclosure has been denied
to Justice Department attorneys 56 and state attorney generals.57
The Supreme Court has recognized the secrecy of a grand jury pro-
ceeding as "indispensable."58
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codify the tradi-
tional rules of grand jury secrecy.59 Under Rule 6(e), a document is
protected from disclosure when it may tend to reveal what took
place before the grand jury, regardless of whether the document is
a government memorandum, transcript of the proceeding, or list of
documents used in the proceeding. When documents are sought
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to
insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is
exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting United States
v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954).
" See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959); Walker,
United States v. Sells: Engineering a Result to Promote Grand Jury Secrecy, 21 AM. CruM.
L. REV. 99, 101-02 (1983).
"6 See United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 427-35 (1983). In Sells, the gov-
ernment contended that under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i), all
attorneys of the Justice Department qualified for automatic disclosure of grand jury materi-
als regardless of the nature of the litigation in which they intended to use the materials. Id.
at 427. The Court held that such disclosure was limited to use by those attorneys who con-
duct the criminal matters to which the materials pertain. Id.
" See Illinois v. Abbot & Assoc., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 568-73 (1983). In Abbot, the Attor-
ney General of Illinois asserted that section 4F(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(f)(b)
(1976), made it unnecessary for him to meet the particularized need standard (see infra
note 63 and accompanying text) generally required in order to obtain access to grand jury
materials. Id. at 559-60. The Court rejected this contention, holding that such a blanket
disclosure request was not permitted by law. Id. at 573.
" See United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1983).
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); see Sells, 463 U.S. at 425. Rule 6(e)(2) states that:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a
typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the government, or any
person to whom disclosure is made under [certain rules] shall not disclose matters
occurring before the grand jury. ...
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
65 David, Lengyel, Manuelian & Sutko, The Federal Grand Jury: Practice and Proce-
dure, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1981); see also In re Grand.Jury Investigation, 610 F.2d 202,
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for their own intrinsic value, they are excluded from Rule 6(e) pro-
tection, but not if the wholesale disclosure would reveal the nature,
scope, and direction of the grand jury investigation.61
In order to overcome the rule of grand jury secrecy, there must
be a compelling necessity for the disclosure.6 2 Furthermore, the
party seeking disclosure must demonstrate that a particularized
need exists that outweighs the need for secrecy. 3 A mere demon-
stration of relevancy or usefulness does not meet movant's burden.
There must be a showing that denial of disclosure will result in
severe prejudice or injustice.6 4 Even when disclosure is warranted,
the request must be narrowly structured to encompass only the
material for which a compelling necessity has been demonstrated. 5
B. Grand Jury Secrecy v. the Need Requirement
The requirement of a preliminary showing of need as to bene-
factor payments unjustifiably burdens the necessity of grand jury
secrecy. Requiring the government to establish need will force the
grand jury to disclose a substantial amount of information about
the state of the investigation. 6 This revelation will not only under-
mine grand jury secrecy,67 but may also compromise the integrity
of the investigation.6 8 Furthermore, it is suggested that requiring
216 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rule 6(e) applies not only to transcripts but to anything which may
tend to reveal what transpired before grand jury).
" David, Lengyel, Manuelian & Sutko, supra note 60, at 7.
" See United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Walker, supra note
55, at 102.
" Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959); United States
v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). "Parties seeking grand jury transcripts under
Rule 6(e) must show. . . that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued
secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only the material so needed." Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
"' See United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
65 See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979); David, Len-
gyel, Manuelian & Sutko, supra note 60, at 12.
6 See In re Sinadinos, 760 F.2d 167, 170 (7th Cir. 1985). The grand jury may be forced
to disclose the facts it had discovered, the source of these facts, the direction of the investi-
gation, and other information still required. See id.
'7 See id.
68 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon John Doe Corp., 570 F.
Supp. 1476, 1480 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). During the time of the grand jury investigation, secrecy is
most important. In re Sinadinos, 760 F.2d 167, 170 (7th Cir. 1985). In addition, the person
seeking the disclosure may be deeply involved in criminal activities. Id. Moreover, the grand
jury and the prosecutor have the right to select the course and direction of the investigation,
not the court or the witness. Id. "The grand jury and the prosecutor best know the status of
the investigation, the value of pursuing addtional leads or shedding new light on traveled
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the government to show need eliminates the compelling necessity
and particularized need burdens traditionally placed upon the
party seeking such disclosures. 69 Thus, it seems apparent the integ-
rity of grand jury secrecy must prevail at the pre-indictment stage.
At the post-indictment stage, when the information is unprivileged
and highly probative,7 0 the target should be required to sustain the
burden of demonstrating compelling necessity and a particularized
need before the grand jury must disclose otherwise secret
information.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A fifth amendment right to an attorney was not recognized un-
til the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona7 in 1966. The
Miranda Court held that in order to safeguard the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination, an individual held for in-
terrogation must be clearly informed that he has a right to consult
an attorney, and all interrogation must cease until the attorney, if
requested, is present.7 2 The sixth amendment protections differ in
that the guarantee of a right to counsel is a fundamental right.73 In
order to demonstrate a waiver of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the state must prove comprehension by the defendant and
an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of his right. 4 The
waiver of a sixth amendment right to counsel is measured by a
paths, or curtailing the investigation." Id.
" See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. The party seeking to quash a sub-
poena carries the burden of showing that the information sought bears no conceivable rele-
vance to any legitimate object of investigation by the federal grand jury. In re Libertore, 574
F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1978).
70 See Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 251; supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
71 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Note, Pretrial Rights to Counsel Under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments: A Distinction Without a Difference, 12 Loy. U. CM L.J. 79, 87 (1980) (until
Miranda, suspect's rights to attorney entirely predicated upon sixth amendment).
72 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 474.
73 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). The sixth amendment does more than re-
quire the state to appoint counsel for indigents. Id. at 344. The right to counsel prevents the
State from conducting trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend them-
selves without adequate legal assistance. Id. The sixth amendment right to counsel "is indis-
pensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice." Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
74 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462-65 (1938) (court must appoint attorney to indigent unless right is intelligently
and competently waived); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir. 1980)
(state has heavy burden of proving knowing and intelligent waiver of sixth amendment
rights).
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higher standard than the waiver of a fifth amendment rightJ 5
It is submitted that because a grand jury target's fifth amend-
ment right to counsel operates as a derivative or implied right, it
does not warrant the same higher level of protection afforded the
explicit and fundamental guarantee of the sixth amendment .76 Ac-
cordingly, since Columbo's sixth amendment right to an attorney
did not require the government to demonstrate need at the pre-
indictment stage, then his fifth amendment right also will not re-
quire a demonstration of need. At the post-indictment stage, be-
cause Columbo's sixth amendment right to counsel yielded to the
grand jury's need for the highly probative information, his fifth
amendment right to counsel must also yield.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has suggested that while the Second Circuit
reached the correct result, an additional argument may be ad-
vanced to buttress the court's holding. The need to maintain grand
jury secrecy is unjustifiably burdened by a "need" requirement at
the pre-indictment stage. At the post-indictment stage, where the
7' United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1980); See Carvey v. Lefevre,
611 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1979) ("What might suffice to comply with Miranda will not neces-
sarily meet the higher standard with respect to waiver of the right to counsel that applies
when the sixth amendment has attached"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 921 (1980); United States
v. Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Even if [the defendant's] statements were
voluntary for purposes of. the fifth amendment.. they were involuntary with regard [to]
the higher standard with respect to waiver of the right to counsel that applies when the
Sixth Amendment has attached") (citation omitted). Columbo asserted that requiring his
attorney to testify as to fee arrangements would implicate his fifth amendment due process
rights. Slotnick, 781 F.2d at 245-46. The Second Circuit stated that the fifth amendment
due process clause provides no greater opportunity for Columbo to halt a grand jury investi-
gation than does the sixth amendment. Id. at 246. It determined that Columbo's due process
rights under the fifth amendment were not more expansive than the protection afforded by
the sixth amendment, and therefore do not require a greater showing before the government
can enforce the subpoena. Id. Thus, Judge Timbers concluded, the fifth amendment does
not require a preliminary showing of need prior to enforce a subpoena served upon the
counsel for an unindicted target of a grand jury investigation. Id.
70 Recent Supreme Court decisions reflect this difference. For example, in United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), the Court stated that the fifth amendment is not
implicated by the use of undercover government agents before indictment because of the
absence of potential for compulsion. Id. at 272. However, the Court asserted that the con-
cept of a knowing waiver of sixth amendment rights does not apply in the context of com-
munications with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the government. Id. at
273. Compare Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (where the Court reversed the convic-
tion by ruling that defendant had not waived his sixth amendment rights) with Rhode Is-
land v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (where, on facts almost identical to Brewer, the Court
upheld defendant's conviction on grounds that his Miranda rights were not violated).
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information sought is relevant and highly probative, the target
must demonstrate compelling necessity and a particularized need
before the grand jury should be forced to make disclosures. Fur-
thermore, when considering a grand jury target's fifth amendment
right to counsel, courts should consider the higher level of protec-
tion traditionally afforded the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Therefore, when the sixth amendment's fundamental right to
counsel does not call for a preliminary showing of need, neither
does the derivative right to counsel of the fifth amendment. Al-
though the defense bar argues that the recent use of grand jury
subpoenas is unconstitutional, such complaints are unjustified
when the subpoena seeks information regarding benefactor
payments.
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